The Future of Codefendant Confessions
Benjamin E. Rosenberg
"Bruton", like "Miranda"' or "Kastiga', has an exalted status in
the criminal law lexicon. Each term is part of the name of a United
States Supreme Court case and is the eponym for a constitutional
right. Similar to "Miranda"and "Kastigar," to say that someone has a
"Bruton right" or a "right under Bruton" more often raises questions
than provides answers. In Bruton v. United States,3 the Court identified
a right crucial to all criminal defendants - the right that the state
not use a nontestifying codefendant's confession against anyone but
the confessor himself.4 In the years since Bruton, numerous cases
have refined, explained, and, often, severely limited this right.
Two recent United States Supreme Court cases, however, have
opened the door for significant developments and clarifications of
the "Bruton right." In Gray v. Maryland,5 the first case, the Supreme
Court reversed a conviction on the grounds that the trial court
improperly admitted into evidence a codefendant's confession that
was redacted in a manner consistent with then-extant Supreme Court
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In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme Court
held that a person placed in custody by state authorities cannot be questioned until

he is informed of certain rights that he can waive by consenting to questioning. The
future of Mirandais uncertain, and will be affected by the Supreme Court's ultimate
assessment of United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted No.
99-5525, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 8199, at *1 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1999), in which the Fourth Circuit

held that Mirandahad been overruled in 1985 by federal statute.
2

Kastigarv. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), provides that a witness afforded

"use immunity" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6002 can be compelled to testify, and that
the government bears the burden of showing that none of the post-testimony
evidence that it collected derived from that compelled testimony. "Kastiga?"hearings

are held to identify the government's evidence that is the "fruit of the tree" of the
compelled testimony, such evidence being inadmissible.
391 U.S. 123 (1968).
4 See id. at 126.
523 U.S. 185 (1998).
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authority. 6 This decision expanded the criminal defendant's Bruton
right by making it harder for the prosecution to get admitted into
evidence the confession of a nontestifying codefendant.
Gray,
however, did not set forth clear guidelines for the development of
Bruton rights. Consequently, the lower courts appear confused about
Gray's significance and appear unable to discern a clear answer to the
questions of whether and how, in a criminal trial against A, the
prosecution can use the confession of nontestifying codefendant B.
In Lilly v. Virginia,7 the second decision, a plurality of the
Supreme Court found that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, from which the Bruton right derives, barred the
admission into evidence of extra-judicial statements against penal
interest where the declarant was unavailable for cross-examination. 8
The Lilly Court emphatically rejected the approach of the majority of
the circuit courts of appeals that statements against penal interest are
presumptively reliable, and thus admissible, without regard to the
defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. Although Lilly
did not involve a Bruton situation - the statement against penal
interest at issue in Lilly was not made by a nontestifying codefendant,
but rather by an alleged accomplice who was not on trial with the
defendant9 - Lilly may have a significant effect on the development
of the Bruton doctrine. The Lilly decision may make courts extremely
wary, in Bruton situations, of allowing a nontestifying codefendant's
confession to be admitted into evidence when there is a reasonable
risk that such a confession will be used improperly against anyone
except the declarant.
This Article examines the Gray and Lilly decisions and assesses
the impact that they may have on the use of the confessions of
nontestifying defendants in multiple-defendant trials. Part I outlines
the Supreme Court's treatment of codefendant confessions from the
first case addressing that issue, Delli Paoli v. United States,'° through the
most recent decision, Gray v. Maryland. Part II assesses the impact
that Gray will have on the use of codefendant confessions and
considers its interpretations by the lower courts.
Part III discusses the Supreme Court's analysis of the
Confrontation Clause in non-Bruton situations, with special emphasis
on the Court's treatment of whether, and under what circumstances,
6

See id. at 188.
119 S. CL 1887 (1999).

8 See id. at 1901.

9 See id. at 1892.
10 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
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statements against penal interest satisfy Confrontation Clause
scrutiny. Until Lilly, the Supreme Court cases followed a trend that
aligned the Confrontation Clause with the Federal Rules of Evidence:
If a statement was not barred by the hearsay provisions of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, then it would also pass muster under
Confrontation Clause scrutiny. That trend made courts extremely lax
in protecting against the dangers posed for defendants by the
confessions of their codefendants. Although it is too early to say with
certainty, Part IV suggests that Lilly may re-awaken the courts to the
dangers against which Bruton rights were intended to protect.
I. FROM DELL! PAOLI V. UNITED STATFSTO GRAY V. MARYLAND. THE
UNSUCCESSFUL SEARCH FOR A WORKABLE RULE

The Confrontation Clause provides that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him[.]"" Although the Confrontation
Clause has engendered much litigation and controversy, the Clause
means at least this: The statement of person A cannot be used in a
criminal prosecution against person B, unless person A is available for
cross-examination by person B. The real question is: What should a
tribunal do when A and B are tried together, and the prosecution
seeks to admit A's statement only against A? The Supreme Court has
answered that question four times from 1957 through 1998, but
differently each time.
A.

Delli Paoli v. United States

The Delli Paoli case arose out of the conviction of Orlando Delli
Paoli for conspiring to transport and possess alcohol." Delli Paoli was
tried jointly with his alleged coconspirators. 3 One of the pieces of
evidence introduced at the trial was the confession of one of Delli
Paoli's codefendants, Whitley. 4
That confession described the
conspiracy generally, and described the roles of several of its
members, including Delli Paoli. 5 The confession identified Delli
Paoli by name and nickname, and it described how Whitley ordered
and received unlawful alcohol from Delli Paoli.' 6 The confession was
admitted into evidence at the close of the trial, along with a clear
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

12 See Delli Paol, 352 U.S. at 233.
Is Seeid.
14 See id. at 233-34.
is See i&at 243-46 (app.).
16 See id. at 245-46
(app.).
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instruction from the court:
This affidavit or admission will be considered by you solely in
connection with your determination of the guilt or innocence of
the defendant Whitley. It is not to be considered as proof in
connection with the guilt or innocence of any of the other
defendants."
On appeal, Delli Paoli argued that the trial court should not
have admitted Whitley's confession into evidence at Delli Paoli's trial
because, notwithstanding the limiting instructions, the jury
considered the confession when evaluating the case against him. 8
The Supreme Court rejected the argument, relying on the clarity of
the instruction (which Delli Paoli did not contest) and the longstanding presumption that juries follow courts' instructions. 9 The
Deli Paoli Court cited substantial authority for the "long-standing
recognition that possible prejudice against other defendants may be
overcome by clear instructions limiting the jury's consideration of a
post-conspiracy declaration solely to the determination of the guilt of
the declarant. '
The dissent did not challenge the precedent on
which the majority relied, but instead relied on the "psychological"
fact that juries cannot always limit their consideration of a person's
confession so as not to take that confession into account in
considering the guilt or innocence of a nondeclarant."
B.

Bruton v. United States

The position of the Delli Paoli dissenters prevailed ten years later
in the Bruton decision, in which the Court overruled Delli Paoli.2 In
Bruton, George William Bruton and a codefendant, Evans, were
jointly tried for an armed postal robbery.u Prior to trial, Evans orally
Id. at 239-40.
is See Delli Paoli, 352 U.S. at 233.
17

It was clear that Whitley's statement was

admissible against Whitley.
19
20

21

See id. at 239-42. But see infra note 109 and accompanying text.

Delli Paoli, 352 U.S. at 239 n.5.

See id. at 247 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Dissenting, Justice Frankfurter stated

that
It]he fact of the matter is that too often such admonition against
misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a
nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the
jurors. The admonition therefore becomes a futile collocation of
words and fails of its purpose as a legal protection to defendants

against whom such a declaration should not tell.
Id.
23

See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968).
See id. at 124.
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confessed to a postal inspector that he and Bruton committed the
armed robbery. 4 The postal inspector testified to the confession
during the trial, and, accordingly, the trial court instructed the jury
-

consistent with the Supreme Court's teaching in Delli Paoli-

that

the jury should consider the confession only against Evans, not
against Bruton.25 Evans and Bruton were convicted, but the Eighth
Circuit overturned Evans's conviction because police had not given
Evans Miranda warnings.26 Relying on Delli Paoli, the intermediate
court affirmed Bruton's conviction.
The Supreme Court reversed, relying on four related arguments.
First, the Court noted that it had decided companion cases involving
the Confrontation Clause since Delli Paoli: Pointer v. Texas? and
Douglas v. Alabama.2 According to the Bruton Court, both cases
emphasized the importance of cross-examination for the defendant
in a criminal trial,30 and the PointerCourt identified the right to crossexamination as "'a major reason underlying the constitutional
confrontation rule."'31
Second, the Bruton Court suggested that Pointer and Douglas
alone did not undermine Deli Paoli.2 The Court explained that the

fundamental premise of Delli Paoliis that the jury would not considera
nontestifying defendant's confession against a codefendant; thus, if
Delli Paoli is correct, then Pointerand Douglas are moot because there
would be no need for the codefendant to cross-examine the
confessing defendant." The Supreme Court observed, however, that
Jackson v. Denno34 effectively repudiated the Delli Paoli premise.3, The
Jackson Court, in considering a Fifth Amendment issue, held that a
court, not a jury, should decide the voluntariness of a confession
before a confession is presented to a jury.3 The relevance of Jackson
for the Bruton Court was that Jackson "expressly rejected the
proposition that ajury, when determining the confessor's guilt, could
24

See id.

25

See id.
at 125 & n.2.

26 See id. at 124 & n.1. Evans was retried and acquitted. See id. at n.1.
27

28

See id.at 124-25.
380 U.S. 400 (1965).

380 U.S. 415 (1965).

See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126-27.
31 Id. at 126 (quoting Pointer, 380 U.S. at 406-07).
32 See id.
at 126-27.
32 See id.
at 126.
378 U.S. 368 (1964).
See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 128.
See Jackson, 378 U.S. at 376-77.
30
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be relied on to ignore his confession of guilt should it find the
confession involuntary.""7 The point was especially significant for the
Bruton Court because not only had Jackson rejected the type of mental
effort that Delli Paoli required, but it had done so by relying, in part,
9
on the dissenting opinion in Deli Paoli.3
Third, the Bruton Court found that the 1966 amendment to Rule
Fourteen of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also evidenced
the Court's repudiation of Delli Paoli's premise.3 9 Rule Fourteen
allowed for severance of trials when ajoint trial would prejudice some
defendants. 4
Finally, the Court noted that "there are some contexts in which
the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so
great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that
the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be
ignored., 4 ' The Court stated that such a context was presented in the
case at bar, "where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial
statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the42
defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial.,
The Court refused to accept limiting instructions as a substitute for
the nondeclarant's constitutional right of cross-examination, because
the effect of limiting instructions is tantamount to no instructions at
all.
C. Richardson v. Marsh
The Supreme Court next visited the issue of the admissibility of
codefendant confessions in Richardson v. Marsh." The evidence in
Richardsondemonstrated that three people - Clarissa Marsh, Kareem
Martin and Benjamin Williams - went to the home of Ollie Scott
and demanded money from her.4 5 Scott gave the money to Martin
and Williams, who then directed Scott, Scott's niece, and the niece's
son to the basement of the house, where Martin shot all three of
them. 0 Only the niece survived, and she testified at the joint trial of

37

Bruton, 391 U.S. at 129.

Seeid.

8sa
39
40
4'

See id. at 131.
See id.

Id. at 135.

42 Id. at 135-36.
43 See Bruton, 391
4
4

U.S. at 137.
481 U.S. 200 (1987).
See id. at 202.
See id.
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Marsh and Williams.
In addition to the niece's testimony, the government introduced
(over Marsh's objection) Williams's confession." The confession
described the events in Scott's house and the perpetrators' car ride to
Scott's house, during which, according to the confession, Martin and
Williams discussed their plan to rob Scott, and Martin said that he
intended to kill the victims following the robbery.49 The confession
was redacted so that it did not mention the fact that Marsh was in the
car with Martin and Williams, and the confession did not refer to
Marsh at any point.w The trial court repeatedly instructed the jury
that it should use the confession only against Williams, not against
Marsh. 5' Also, Marsh took the stand and testified that she had
traveled to Scott's house with Martin and Williams to borrow money
from Scott, and that although she was present at the robbery, she was
surprised by and did not take part in either the robbery or murder. 52
The jury apparently did not believe Marsh's testimony because it
found her guilty of "two counts of felony murder in the perpetration
of an armed robbery and one count of assault with intent to commit
murder."53 Her appeal failed, and Marsh filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, arguing that the admission of Williams's confession
violated her constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause.5
The district court denied her petition, but the Sixth Circuit
reversed. 55 According to the circuit court, the Bruton doctrine
required the reversal of Marsh's conviction because the admission of
Williams's confession violated Marsh's Confrontation Clause rights.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict
among the circuit courts of appeals as to whether Bruton barred the
admission of a nontestifying codefendant's confession if (a) the
confession taken in conjunction with all of the other evidence at the trial
inculpates the defendant (the "contextual implication" or
"evidentiary linkage" approach) or only if (b) the confession on its
face inculpates the defendant. 57 The Court phrased the issue
47
4

49

See id. "Martin was a fugitive at the time of trial." Id.
See id. at 203 & n. 1.

See id.

See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 203 n.1.
51 See id. at 204.
50

52

53
54
5
56

57

See id.
Id. at 205.
See id.

See id.
See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 205-6.
See id. at 206. Compare, e.g., United States v. Belle, 593 F.2d 487, 493 (3d Cir.
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presented to it as follows:
In Bruton v. United States,... we held that a defendant is deprived
of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when his
nontestifying codefendant's confession naming him as a
participant in the crime is introduced at their joint trial, even if
the jury is instructed to consider that confession only against the
codefendant. Today we consider whether Bruton requires the
same result when the codefendant's confession is redacted to
omit any reference to the defendant, but the defendant is
nonetheless linked to the confession by evidence properly
admitted against him at trial. 58
The Court answered the question in the negative: Bruton did not
require the exclusion of a codefendant's confession as long as that
confession did not facially implicate the defendant."
The Richardson Court began its analysis by identifying two
premises. First, the Court observed that the Confrontation Clause
requires that "where two defendants are tried jointly, the pretrial
confession of one cannot be admitted against the other unless the
confessing defendant takes the stand."60 Second, the Court stated
that the law generally presumes that jurors follow their instructions
and, thus, if they are instructed to disregard certain evidence against
one defendant, they are presumed to have followed that instruction.6'
The Court then explained that Bruton acknowledged a narrow
exception to the second premise: When a codefendant's confession
is "powerfully incriminating," the presumption that jurors follow
instructions is not applicable. 62 As the Richardson Court understood
Bruton, however, nontestifying codefendants' confessions were so
"powerfully incriminating" as to justify exclusion only if they facially
incriminated the defendant; confessions that incriminated through
"linkage" to other evidence were not excludable.'

1979) (stating that Bruton bars a confession only if the confession on its face
inculpates the defendant: "When a co-defendant's extrajudicial statement does not
directly implicate the defendant, however, the Bruton rule does not come into play")
with Clark v. Maggio, 737 F.2d 471, 477 (5th Cir. 1984) and English v. United States,
620 F.2d 150, 152 (7th Cir. 1980) ("The introduction of a confession from which the
names of co-defendants have been excised may violate the Bruton rule if in context the

statement is clearly inculpating of a co-defendant, and vitally important to the
Government's case.") (emphasis added).
Richardson, 481 U.S. at 201-02.
59See

id. at 211.

6 Id. at 206.
61 See id.
6 See id. at
207.
6
See id. at 208.
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The Court offered two reasons for its narrow reading of Bruton.
First, the Court asserted that, while ajury could not be expected with
any degree of confidence to ignore a facially incriminatory piece of
evidence even if instructed to do so, a jury could be expected to
ignore a piece of evidence that is not facially incriminatory but,
rather, incriminates only through evidentiary linkage."
Second, the Richardson Court emphasized that Bruton must be
read narrowly for practical reasons.0 The Court explained that if
Bruton is limited to excluding confessions that are facially
incriminatory, then "Bruton can be complied with by redaction.""
The Court conjectured that if confessions that inculpate a
codefendant through linkage are barred, then (a) the confession
could not be made admissible by redaction, and significant evidence
against the confessing codefendant would be lost, and (b) it would be
impossible to foresee prior to trial whether the confession would be
admissible because it would be impossible to predict with confidence
the presence or strength of the other "linking" evidence.67
The Court recognized that any Bruton-related problems could be
avoided by having separate trials for confessing defendants. 6 That
was too high a price to pay, according to the Court, because joint
trials are an integral part of the criminal justice system." Further, the
Court pointed out that severance would impair the fairness and
efficiency of the system of criminal justice by forcing prosecutors to
bring separate proceedings, to present identical evidence repeatedly,
and by requiring witnesses and victims to repeat the trauma and
inconvenience of testifying. 70
Thus, the Court held that "the Confrontation Clause is not
violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's confession
with a proper limiting instruction when, as here, the confession is
redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's name, but any
See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208. According to the Court,
[w]here the necessity of such linkage is involved, it is a less valid
generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction to
disregard the evidence. Specific testimony that "the defendant helped
me commit the crime" is more vivid than inferential incrimination, and
hence more difficult to thrust out of mind.
Id.
6

See id.

Id. at 209.

The Richardson Court noted that Bruton had suggested that

possibility. See id.
67

68
69

70

See id.
See id.

See id.
See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 210.
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reference to his or her existence."7 The Court did not express an
opinion "on the admissibility of a confession in which the defendant's
name has been replaced with a symbol or neutral pronoun."7
D. Gray v. Maryland
Gray, like Richardson, involved a codefendant's redacted
confession." Unlike Richardson, however, the confession referred to
the defendant's existence, but did not mention the defendant by
name.74 Gray thus presented exactly the question left open by
Richardson: What result when the defendant's name is replaced by a
neutral pronoun or symbol?
Gray arose out of the murder trial of two men, Kevin D. Gray and
Anthony Bell, who were accused of beating to death a man named
Stacey Williams.75 At trial, a statement that Bell gave to police at the
time of his arrest was read to the jury, along with instructions that the
jury consider the confession only against Bell, and not against Gray.76
When the police officer read the statement to the jury, he replaced
the name "Gray" with "deleted. 7 7 The confession itself was redacted
so that a blank space replaced Gray's name throughout.78 The
confession read, in relevant part, as follows:
(Q) What can you tell me about the beating of Stacey Williams
that occurred on 10 November 1993
(A) An argument broke out between [deleted] and Stacey in the
500 blk of Louden Ave[.] Stacey got smacked and then ran into
Wildwood Parkway. Me [deleted], [deleted] and a few other guys
ran after Stacey. We caught up to him on Wildwood Parkway. We
beat Stacey up.
(Q) Who was in the group that beat Stacey
(A) Me, [deleted], [deleted] and a few other guys
(Q) Do you have the other guys names
(A) [Deleted], [deleted] and me, I don't remember who was out
there
71

Id. at 211.
Id. at211 n.5.
SeeGray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 188 (1998).

73
74 See id.
7

See id

See id. at 188-89.
" See id. at 188.
76

78

See id. at 198-200 (app.).
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(Q)Do you have a black jacket with Park Heights written on the
back
(A) Yeh
(Q)Who else has these jacket[s].
(A) [deleted], [deleted]79
Immediately after the police officer read the confession as redacted,
he testified that upon receiving the confession from Bell, the police
were able to arrest Gray for the murder. 80 The inference was clear
that Gray's name had been redacted from the confession.
Gray was convicted, and the intermediate appellate court
reversed his conviction on the grounds that the admission of Bell's
statement violated the holding of Bruton.81 The Maryland Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and reinstated the
conviction. 2 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider "Bruton's application to a redaction that replaces a name'
with an obvious blank space or symbol or word such as 'deleted,"' n
and reversed.
In its decision, the Supreme Court emphasized that there was no
difference, as a practical matter, between a codefendant's confession
including a defendant's name - plainly violative of Bruton- and the
same confession with the defendant's name replaced by "an obvious
blank space or a word such as 'deleted' or a symbol or other similarly
obvious indication[] of alteration. 84 In either instance, the Court
surmised, the jury would know that the codefendant's confession
implicates the defendant."
Indeed, the Gray Court emphasized that redaction might be
harmful to the defendant because the obvious deletion may call the
jurors' attention directly to the removed name.86 The Court asserted

80
81

Gray, 523 U.S. at 198-99 (app.).
See id. at 188-89.

See id. at 189.

82

See id.

93

Id.

84

Id. at 192.

85

Gray, 523 U.S. at 193. The Gray Court stated that
a jury will often react similarly to an unredacted confession and a
confession redacted in this way, for the jury will often realize that the
confession refers specifically to the defendant. This is true even when
the State does not blatantly link the defendant to the deleted name, as
it did in this case ....

Id.
8

See id.
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that "[b]y encouraging the jury to speculate about the reference, the
redaction may overemphasize the importance of the confession's
accusation - once the jurors work out the reference."8' 7 The Court
pointed out that blanks and the word "delete" act just like names.88
They are referents, the Gray Court explained, and, although blanks
and the word "delete" may be less obvious referents than names,
"considered as a class, redactions that replace a proper name with an
obvious blank, the word 'delete,' a symbol, or similarly notify the jury
that a name has been deleted are similar enough to Bruton's
unredacted confessions as to warrant the same legal results.""
Although a simple replacement of a defendant's name with the
word "delete," a blank space, or symbol would not satisfy Bruton, the
Gray Court contended that most codefendant confessions can be
redacted in such a way that they can be used.9 The Court gave as an
example a portion of Bell's confession:
Question: Who was in the group that beat Stacey?
Answer: Me, deleted, deleted, and a few other guys.91
The Court asked why the witness could not, instead, have said:
Question: Who was in the group that beat Stacey?
92
Answer: Me and a few other guys.
The Gray Court conceded that it was blurring the distinction on
which Richardson rested between confessions that were facially
incriminatory and those that were incriminatory "only" by inference."
The Supreme Court reasoned, however, that
inference pure and simple cannot make the critical difference,
for if it did, then Richardson would also place outside Bruton's
scope confessions that use shortened first names, nicknames,
descriptions as unique as the "red-haired, bearded, one-eyed man-

with-a-limp," and perhaps even full names of defendants who are
always known by a nickname. This Court has assumed, however,

that nicknames and specific descriptions fall inside, not outside,
Bruton's protection ....
That being so, Richardson must depend.., upon the kind of, not
the simple fact of, inference. Richardson's inferences involved

statements that did not refer directly to the defendant himself
Id.
See id. at 195.
89 Id. at 195.
90 See id. at 196.
91 Gray, 523 U.S. at 196.
87

88

9

Id.

93

See id. at 195.
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and which became incriminating "only when linked with evidence
introduced later at trial." The inferences at issue here involve
statements that, despite redaction, obviously refer directly to
someone, often obviously the defendant, and which involve
inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even
were the confession the very first item introduced at trial.9

II. CODEFENDANT CONFESSIONS AFTER GRAY V. MARYLAND
Gray is a significant case because it corrects an obvious failure in
the application of the Bruton rule in criminal prosecutions.
Numerous courts following Bruton and Richardson had permitted a
nontestifying defendant's statement to be read to the jury with blanks
or redactions in the statement, even when the blanks or redactions
obviously referred to a codefendant. Precisely the harm that Bruton
identified and purportedly safeguarded against - the incrimination
of a codefendant by evidence that he could not impeach - was
realized. The instruction that the jury should not consider the
confession against the codefendant was transparently fictive. Gray is
therefore welcome, at the least, because it eliminates a source of
cynicism and unreality from criminal trials. Gray, however, leaves
several difficult questions in its wake.
A.

What Inferences Are Permissible?

The Court's observation in Gray that it is the type and not the
fact of inference that matters is opaque, and the Court did not
elaborate on what types of inferences are and are not permissible.
The Court stated that nicknames are impermissible, but nicknames
A person's nickname becomes
incriminate only inferentially.
meaningful only after the jury has some way, by the evidence
presented at a trial, to connect the nickname to a defendant.
Similarly, descriptions of how a person walks, talks, or otherwise
presents himself can be incriminating only after a jury has heard
some evidence that links the description to a defendant. In either
situation, the confession incriminates inferentially. If the inferences
implicated by physical descriptions or nicknames are impermissible,
what distinguishes them from permissible inferences?
Gray observed that the confession that the Court was considering
"involve [d] inferences that ajury ordinarily could make immediately,
even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial."9 5

Id. at 195-96 (citations omitted).
95 Id. at 196.
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The jury cannot draw
This observation, however, is puzzling.
inferences if the confession were the first piece of evidence because
the jury would have nothing from which to draw inferences. The
only exception would be if the jury could draw inferences based on
the parties' opening statements, but there is no indication that this
was so in Gray or that this is what the Court meant.
Perhaps because the distinction between permissible and
impermissible inferences is not clear, several lower federal courts
have ignored Gray's distinction and have held that confessions that
incriminate inferentially are not objectionable. For example, in
United States v. Wilson,9 the court noted that "the Court in Gray
revisited Bruton and Richardson to clarify that statements that
incriminate only inferentially are outside the scope of Bruton."97 The
Wilson court ruled that the confession at issue in Wilson incriminated
the nonconfessing defendant "only when it was linked with other
evidence at trial[,]" and was therefore not objectionable.98 This
reading of Gray is not persuasive because it ignores the Gray Court's
statement that it is "the kind of, not the simple fact of, inference" that
matters, and it ignores the Gray Court's square rejection of the notion
that, as long as a confession incriminates "only inferentially," it is
nonobjectionable.
Similarly, in United States v. Edwards," the Eighth Circuit found
that a confession was admissible as long as the nontestifying
codefendant's name was replaced by a "pronoun or similarly neutral
word," and the confession did not "facially incriminate or lead the
jury directly to a nontestifying declarant's codefendant."'00 It is
unclear whether a confession that leads to a codefendant inferentially
but not "directly" would be barred under the holding in Edwards.
Similar to the Wilson decision, the Edwards court may be criticized for
not giving enough weight to Gray's admittedly elusive suggestion that
not all inferentially incriminating confessions are alike.
In light of Gray, it is uncertain how a court should evaluate the
96
97

160 F.3d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 81 (1999).

Id. at 740 n.5.

Id.; see also United States v. Walker, 148 F.3d 518, 522 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding,
post-Gray, that "[w] here the reference to the defendant is indirect and the jury can
only complete the inference by relying on other evidence in the trial, Bruton will not
apply"); United States v. Valdez, 146 F.3d 547, 552 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 355 (1998) (holding, post-Gray, that a confession was admissible because it "does
not itself" implicate the confessing codefendant). Curiously, Walker contained a
citation to Gray preceded by "but see." See Waler, 148 F.3d at 522.
159 F.3d 1117 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 310 (1999).
100Id. at 1125.
98
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following hypothetical, which is fictitious but not extraordinary.
Suppose that two defendants, A and B, are being jointly tried for
robbing a store and murdering the cashier by stabbing her with a
knife. Suppose further that an eyewitness, W, testifies that she saw A
and B enter the store and that A was carrying a green-handled knife.
The attorneys for A and B attack W's credibility on cross-examination
by noting, for example, that she was drunk when she allegedly saw A
and B, that she has poor eyesight, and that she had a grudge against
either of them. The prosecutor then calls a police officer to testify
that when he arrested B, the police officer took a self-incriminatory
statement in which B admitted that he went with A to the store and
that he saw A carrying a green-handled knife.
Obviously, the
statement is devastating to A because even if A's name is redacted
from the statement, the fact that the confession corroborates a key
detail of Ws story - the green-handled knife - bolsters Ws
testimony against A in all respects. Yet, under the Wilson and Edwards
court's reading of Gray, there would be no Confrontation Clause
problem, simply because the inference, though potentially
devastating, operates "only when linked with other evidence at the
trial." Such a result is highly problematic, for although it may
generally be true, as Richardsonstated, that "inferential incrimination"
is easier for ajury to "thrust out of mind," that is certainly not true in
all circumstances.' 1
In the example given, the inferential
incrimination may be critical evidence against A, which A would have
no way to combat through cross-examination.' 0
B.

The Obviousness of Deletions and the Problem of Pronouns

As noted above, the Gray Court observed that the obviousness of
a deletion would only draw attention to the deletion, and thereby
would lead the jury to speculate about whose name was deleted and
why.'03 Such speculation often would be harmful to the nontestifying
codefendant on whose behalf the deletion was purportedly made.
See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 207 (1987).
See also United States v. Gilliam, 167 F.3d 628, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
120 S. Ct. 118 (1999) (finding that defendant's Confrontation Clause challenge
failed because declarant's statement did not expressly implicate defendant); United
States v. Mejia, 165 F.3d 919, 1998 WL 895380, at *3 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1998) (finding
that the admission into evidence of taped transcripts did not violate the rights of
defendant under the Confrontation Clause because "[t]he transcripts only
inferentially incriminated [defendant], [defendant's] name was redacted from the
transcripts, and the district court gave the jury a proper limiting instruction").
103 See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text (explaining that a
jury will react
similarly to both redacted and unredacted confessions).
101
102
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Gray was concerned with the obviousness of the redactions in the
confession that the Court considered, and regarded the obviousness
as a significant factor in finding that the confession was
impermissible.
Does this mean that as long as a confession is redacted subtly
if, for example, instead of the deletion being marked by the words
"deleted" or "name omitted," a proper name is replaced with a
pronoun - then the confession may be admitted? Some courts have
answered the question in the affirmative. The Edwards court, for
example, relied on the distinction between obvious redactions and
"neutral pronouns" and insisted that the redaction be made with "a
pronoun or similarly neutral word."'" Also, in United States v. VejarUrias,0 5 the Fifth Circuit held that "where a defendant's name is
replaced by a neutral pronoun, as long as identification of the
defendant is clear or inculpatory only by reference to evidence other
than the redacted confession, and a limiting instruction is given to
the jury, there is no Bruton violation.""°
There is much force to the suggestion that confessions in which
names are redacted with "neutral pronouns" are preferable to
confessions marked with "obvious deletions." But even neutral
pronouns may be problematic. The precise definition of a "neutral"
pronoun is unclear. If it suggests "not facially incriminating," then it
is meaningless because no pronouns are "facially incriminating." All
pronouns require additional evidence to link them inferentially to
the defendant. In this respect, pronouns are no different from
nicknames or descriptions because they can incriminate inferentially.
How, then, are pronouns less injurious than are nicknames?
There may be instances in which pronouns severely prejudice
the nonconfessing defendant. If the case involves violence, for
example, the use of pronouns rather than names may lead jurors to
believe that the confessor was afraid to name the person referred to
only by pronouns. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged as much in
07
United States v. Peterson,1
in which the court held that "Gray clarifies
that the substitution of a neutral pronoun or symbol in place of the
defendant's name is not permissible if it is obvious that an alteration
-

104

United States v. Edwards, 159 F.3d 1117, 1125 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
120

S. Ct. 310 (1999).

105 165 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999).

Id. at 340; see also United States v. Tisdale, No. 98-1362(L), 98-1363, 1999 WL
1024661, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 3 1999) (The Second Circuit upheld the propriety of
introducing a codefendant confession that "did not contain any 'obvious indication
of deletion.'" The Author was appellate counsel for the defendant.).
107 140 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 1998).
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has occurred to protect the identity of a specific person."'
The emphasis on "neutral pronouns" may be unnecessarily
formalistic. It is certainly possible that a declaration may implicate
people other than declarants even if it has only neutral pronouns.
Consider the following hypothetical derived from the Richar&on case.
Suppose that defendants A and B are being tried together for the
murder of V,and B's defense is that, although he was with A for most
of the evening in question, when A went into Vs house (and,
apparently, killed her), B remained in the car. Further, suppose that
A made a confession to the police in which he stated "B and I went
into the house and killed V" Finally, suppose that the government
wants to redact the statement with a neutral pronoun to read: "We
went into the house, and killed V"
Any person would have to doubt whether relating such a
confession to the jury, even with a limiting instruction, would
adequately protect B. The jury would hear "we went into the house"
and would know from all of the other evidence that the only people
who could possibly constitute the "we" are A and B. It would defy the
abilities of most people to disregard that evidence when assessing
whether B went into the house with A to kill V Jury studies tend to
support the proposition that many jurors would likely not be able to
disregard such evidence,'7 and the use of confessions with neutral
pronouns may, depending on the circumstances, be so incriminating
to the nonconfessing codefendants that "the practical and human
limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.""0
Moreover,
defendants who fear that they will be prejudiced by a codefendant's
confession will typically be unable to obtain a severance on that
ground. In fact, since the Bruton decision, courts rarely have granted
such severances, and the Supreme Court has expressed a "preference
in the federal system for joint trials of defendants who are indicted
together.""'
logId. at 822.
See Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules
404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135, 175-78 (1989) (discussing studies on
curative instructions and noting that "[tihe empirical research demonstrates that
109

jurors are deeply affected by prejudicial comments and evidence and that curative
instructions tend to increase the prejudice rather than decrease it. Moreover, the

research shows that the impact is much greater in weak cases than in strong ones.");
see also Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir. 1962) ("[O]ne 'cannot
unring a bell'; 'after the thrust of the saber it is difficult to say forget the wound...
110 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968).

I

Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993); see also, e.g., United States v.

Delpitt, 94 F.3d 1134, 1143 (8th Cir. 1996) ("The presumption against severing
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Finally, a blanket rule that "redaction by neutral pronouns is per
se acceptable" would be too expansive a reading of Gray. Suppose a
confession reveals a crime committed by the confessor and another
person, referred to only as "he" or "a guy," and also notes that the
other unnamed person lives in a certain apartment. Suppose further
that there is evidence introduced at trial that a nonconfessing
The inference that the
defendant lives in that apartment.
nonconfessing codefendant is the "guy" referred to in the confession
is obvious; the address is as much of an identifier as a nickname or a
physical description. The Gray decision indicates that nicknames and
physical descriptions may render confessions inadmissible in joint
trials. It is uncertain whether there is a principled distinction that
can be drawn between nicknames and physical descriptions on the
one hand, and neutral pronouns with addresses on the other.
C.

The Problem of FabricatingEvidence

The dissent in Gray correctly noted that one concern about the
majority's proposed revision of the confession is that it might
implicate the trial court in fabricating evidence.'12 That concern,
however, may be overstated. In most instances, the problem could be
avoided by directed questioning by the prosecutor and by
introducing into evidence not the confession itself, but testimony
about the confession given by the law enforcement officer who was
present when the confession was taken. For example, in Gray the
testimony might have been elicited as follows:

progerly joined cases is strong.").
V See Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 203-04 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In
the present case, [the majority] asks, why could the police officer not have testified
that Bell's answer was 'Me and a few other guys'? The answer, it seems obvious to
me, is because that is not what Bell said.") (citation omitted).
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Confession as
Presented to Jury
Q: Who was in the

Confession as Proposed
by Gray Majority
Q: Who was in the

group that beat

group that beat

Stacey?

Stacey?

A: Me, deleted,
deleted, and a

few other guys.

A: Me and a few other
guys.

Proposed Revision
of Confessio
Q: Did Bell tell you

who beat Stacey?
A: Yes.

Q: Did he say that he
had taken part in
the beating?
A: Yes.

Q: Did he say that he
had done so alone
or with others?
A: He said that he
had done so with
others.
It is likely that in the vast majority of cases it would be possible to
paraphrase a declarant's statement so that the probative value of the
statement against the declarant is preserved, the prejudice to the
nondeclarant codefendant is minimized, and the government or the
trial judge is not subject to a charge of fabricating evidence. If the
declarant's statement is not written, for example, but is simply
recounted by a testifying witness (typically an agent or police officer
who took the statement), then it would be quite simple for the
testifying witness to make clear that he is merely paraphrasing the
declarant's statement and not recounting it verbatim. In Old Chief v.
United States,"' the Supreme Court acknowledged (albeit in a
different context) the appropriateness of redacting records, or even
requiring a stipulation, to accommodate both the government's right
to prove its case and the defendant's right to avoid undue
Similarly, in most cases it is possible to protect the
prejudice."
essential integrity of the declarant's statement without causing a
fetishistic aversion to any of the alterations.
Paraphrasing or limited rewriting should also be allowed in
order to avoid inferences that the jury might not be able to disregard
notwithstanding an instruction to do so. In the green-handled knife
113 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
14

See id. at 191 n.1O.
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hypothetical," 5 for example, it might be appropriate to redact the
reference in B's confession to the knife's green handle on the
grounds that the particularity of the reference makes the inferential
strength of B's confession against A irresistible to the jury. Such a
redaction would have to be done in a nonobvious manner. As the
Gray Court observed, an obvious redaction does little good, and may
do much harm, to the defendant whose rights the redaction
supposedly protects. Courts routinely suppress unfairly inflammatory
portions of documentary evidence while allowing the remaining,
probative portion of the document to be admitted into evidence." 6 A
nonobvious redaction or paraphrase of certain details in a confession,
therefore, would not be unprecedented.
A prosecutor might argue that redaction of the reference to the
green-handled knife is unfair to the government's case because the
particularity and precision of B's confession and its neat dovetailing
with the eyewitness's testimony make B's confession more reliable
and more probative of B's guilt. Thus, the prosecutor might argue
that the government should not be required to forego probative
evidence against confessor Bjust to protect the rights of codefendant
A. Furthermore, the prosecutor might contend that allowing the
redaction of the reference in B's confession to the knife's green
handle is but the first step down a slippery slope: If the reference to
the green handle is redacted, then why not the reference to the knife
itself? And if that, then why not the reference to any other details
that might incriminate A inferentially?
The prosecutor's argument has some force, but it does not lead
to the conclusion that redaction or paraphrasing of a confession to
avoid powerful inferences against the confessor's codefendants is
never justified. The strength of the impermissible inferences that a
jury may be tempted to draw from a confession will vary depending
upon the particular circumstances of the case. Some judgment must
be applied to determine the likelihood that a jury could abide by the
court's instruction not to consider a confession against any defendant
other than the confessor. The jury surely could follow the judge's
instructions in most instances. If the inferences would be particularly
difficult for a jury to banish from its collective mind, however, the
judge could give the prosecution a choice: Either (a) agree to the

n5 See supra II.A.

1,6 For example, courts may not allow particularly gruesome portions of crime

scene photographs into evidence, and they routinely redact the particulars of
criminal records in trials in which the defendant's status as a felon is an element of
the offense. See generaUy Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
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redaction or paraphrase to protect the rights of the confessor's
codefendants or (b) sever the trial of the confessor from that of his
codefendants.
III. THE RELIABILITY THEORY OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND
THE PROBLEM OF STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST

Although the cases from Delli Paoli through Gray have differed,
they have shared and relied upon a common premise: The use of the
confession of a nontestifying codefendant against any defendant
other than the confessor would violate the nonconfessor's Sixth
The
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.
question that has occupied the Court from Deli Paoli through Gray
has been how to protect the nonconfessor's right of confrontation
The premise, however, was
without requiring separate trials.
undermined in a series of Supreme Court cases that were decided
during the same time period as Delli Paoli through Gray. The premise
was on the brink of extinction until Lilly.
The Reliability Theory of the Confrontation Clause and the
Constitutionalizationof the HearsayRules

A.

"[i]n all criminal
The words of the confrontation clause to be confronted
the
right..,
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
7
with the witnesses against him"" - are clear and unexceptionable
and would appear to require all witnesses against a defendant to
appear in court and face the defendant when giving testimony against
The Supreme Court, however, has not interpreted the
him.
Confrontation Clause literally; rather, the Court has identified an
underlying purpose of the Confrontation Clause and has interpreted
the Confrontation Clause in light of that purpose. In the course of
interpreting the Clause in this fashion, the Court has turned the
Confrontation Clause into little more than a rule against hearsay that
mimics the Federal Rules of Evidence. That is, if a piece of evidence
would not be barred by the rules against hearsay as set forth in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, then it will not be barred by the
Confrontation Clause; if the Federal Rules of Evidence bar such
evidence, then the Confrontation Clause similarly bars such evidence.
The Supreme Court has stated often that the "mission of the
Confrontation Clause" is to promote the accuracy of evidence in
criminal trials." 8 To further that "mission," in Ohio v. Roberts"9 the
17 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
18

Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990); Boujaily v. United States, 483
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Supreme Court established a two-step test, according to which an outof-court statement could be admitted without violating the
Confrontation Clause only if two conditions are satisfied:
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination
at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing
that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only
if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be
inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence
must be excluded, at least absent
a showing of particularized
20
guarantees of trustworthiness.
The first point to note about this Confrontation Clause test is its
breadth - it applies to all out-of-court statements. This suggests that
the phrase "witnesses against him" in the Confrontation Clause
means persons making statements, outside of court, which statements
the prosecution may wish to put into evidence. It is by no means
clear that the scope of the Sixth Amendment should be interpreted
so broadly.
In any event, since Roberts, the Supreme Court relaxed the first
condition (the unavailability of the declarant) in United States v.
Inad 1 and White v. Illinois.'2 In Inadi, the government was permitted
to introduce an alleged coconspirator's statement made in
furtherance of a conspiracy, notwithstanding that the prosecution
made no showing that the coconspirator was unavailable to testify.2 s
The White Court permitted hearsay testimony about the excited
utterances of a four-year-old girl who accused the defendant of
having sexually abused her.24 The future of the unavailability
requirement is well summarized by Professor Richard Friedman:
The emerging pattern is not hard to spot: follow the Federal
Rules. Notwithstanding Inadi and White, it would not be
surprising were the Court to hold - if a proper case arose - that
the Confrontation Clause's unavailability requirement is not
strictly limited to prior testimony. It likely applies to statements
offered under any of the other hearsay exceptions - most
prominently declarations against interest - for which the
U.S. 171, 200 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387,
396 (1986); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
19 448 U.S. 56
(1980).
12
1
1
123

124

Id. at 66.
475 U.S. 387 (1986).
502 U.S. 346 (1992).
See Inadi, 475 U.S. at 400.
See White, 502 U.S. at 348-49.

538

SETON HALL LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 30:516

Federal Rules of Evidence require unavailability. ' 2s
The "sufficient indicia of trustworthiness" prong of the Roberts
Confrontation Clause test also conforms the Confrontation Clause to
the Federal Rules of Evidence on account of the proviso that
"[r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case where the
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception."'2 Firmly
rooted hearsay exceptions are, by and large, those set forth in the
Federal Rules of Evidence; thus, once again, if an out-of-court
statement satisfies one of the exceptions to the rule against hearsay
set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence, chances are it will also
satisfy the constitutional requirements of the Confrontation Clause.
B.

The PeculiarProblem of Statements Against PenalInterest: The
Demise of the Bruton-Gray Prohibition?

Of particular importance for present purposes is whether
statements against penal interest, which fall within an exception to
the rule against hearsay codified in Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b) (3),' "fall[] within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or are
supported by a "showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. " "' Before Lilly, the Supreme Court twice avoided
answering the question, but the majority of the lower federal courts
answered it in the affirmative, often without extensive analysis'ss
125

Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEo.

LJ.

1011, 1017 (1998) (footnote omitted).
126 Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
1
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) (3) provides that a statement against interest
is
[a] statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to
subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a
claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the
declarant's position would not have made the statement unless
believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to
criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible
unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness
of the statement.
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) (3).
128 See Roberts, 448 U.S.
at 66.
1
See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S.
530 (1986).
m Compare United States v. Moses, 148 F.3d 277, 281 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S.Ct. 1047 (1999) (observing that the district court found that the exception is
firmly rooted for Confrontation Clause purposes, but declining to address that
issue); United States v. Keltner, 147 F.3d 662, 671 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that the
exception is firmly rooted for Confrontation Clause purposes); Neuman v. Rivers,
125 F.3d 315, 319-20 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1030 (1997) (same);
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The majority's answer is deeply problematic. If statements
against penal interest are "firmly rooted" exceptions to the rule
barring hearsay, then the entire line of cases from Deli Paolithrough
Gray is moot: The codefendant confessions should be admissible
without any redactions or qualifications against the nontestifying
defendants because those confessions (a) satisfy Rule 804(b) (3) and
(b) inevitably, therefore, also pass scrutiny under the Confrontation
Clause.
The problem is further illustrated by consideration of questions
that the use of plea allocutions pose. When a person pleads guilty, he
may implicate others, and thus the question arises whether and how
the government can use the plea against other, nonpleading
defendants. According to the reasoning of the Bruton line of cases,
the answer would appear to be simple: If a confession cannot be
offered to prove any part of the case against a nonconfessing
defendant but is admissible only against the confessor himself (which
is the premise of the Deli Paoli-Gray line of cases), then a plea
allocution should not be admissible at all because the pleader is, by
definition, not on trial: The raison d'admissionis gone. Conversely, a
guilty plea is a clear statement against penal interest - if statements
against penal interest are firmly rooted exceptions to the rule barring
hearsay and thus pass Confrontation Clause scrutiny, then the plea
should be able to be admitted in full, without any redactions, against
nonpleading defendants at trial.
Faced with this conundrum, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals took a position firmly in the middle. The Second Circuit
permits the government to use plea allocutions in trials against
nonpleading defendants who are implicated by the pleas as long as
(a) the defendants' names are redacted, and (b) the jury is instructed
that it is not to use the allocutions against the defendants directly, but
only as evidence of, for example, the existence and scope of the
alleged conspiracy. 3 ' The theory underlying the admissibility of the
United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 779 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1105
(1996) (same); and United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1362 (7th Cir. 1991)
(noting that the Roberts Court concluded "that no independent inquiry into
reliability is required when 'the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception'") (citation omitted) with United States v. Flores, 985 F.2d 770, 775-76 (5th
Cir. 1993) (finding that the exception is not firmly rooted for Confrontation Clause
purposes).
. See United States v. Gallego, 191 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v.
Williams, 927 F.2d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that confession of a coconspirator
can be used to demonstrate the existence and scope of the conspiracy); United States
v. Winley, 638 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Medina-Rojas, 112 F.3d 506,
1996 WL 591328, at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 15, 1996) (stating that a "plea allocution of a co-
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plea allocutions is that they are statements against penal interest and,
therefore, they come under the hearsay exception afforded by
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) (3)."8 But if plea allocutions are
admissible against nonpleading defendants, then it is not clear why
the same reasoning would not allow confessions to be used against
nonconfessing defendants. Further, if confessions can be used
consistent with the nonconfessor's rights under the Confrontation
Clause, then the entire discussion that has consumed the Court's
attention from Delli Paoli through Graywould appear to be moot.
C. Lilly v. Virginia
The confusion was resolved in Lilly v. Virginia.33 Benjamin Lee
Lilly, his brother, and a third person were charged with committing
several crimes, including abduction, robbery, carjacking, murder, and
possession and use of a firearm.3 4 Lilly's brother Mark made a taped
confession following their arrest"8 The confession implicated Lilly,
the third accomplice, and Mark, although it emphasized Lilly's role
as the leader of the group and specifically identified Lilly as the
person who had committed the murder.36 Lilly was tried separately
from the others, and when Mark refused to testify (and was thus
unavailable), the prosecution moved into evidence the tape
recording of the brother's confession against Lilly 7 The trial court
admitted the tape recording into evidence, and Lilly was convicted."
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction, rejecting
Lilly's Confrontation Clause challenge to the admission of the taped
confession on the grounds that the confession was a statement
against penal interest, which is a firmly rooted hearsay exception,
and
39
thus satisfied the strictures of the Confrontation Clause.
conspirator is properly admitted at trial as a statement against penal interest, and
may be considered by the jury as evidence of the existence and scope of the
conspiracy"); see also United States v. Wilson, No. 95 CR 668(LMM), 1999 WL
126456, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1999) (admitting plea allocutions pursuant to
United States v. Williams).
132 See supra note 127 (setting forth text of rule 804(b)(3)).
Of course, other

requirements must be satisfied - the pleader must be unavailable, which he usually
is by virtue of the likely invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. See, e.g., Williams, 927 F.2d at 98-99.
1

"8

119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999).
See Lilly v. Virginia, 449 S.E.2d 522, 563 (Va. 1998).

35

SeeLilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1892.

36

See id.

137

See id. at 1892-93.

138 See id. at 1893.
139

See id.
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The United States Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion,
reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia.'40 The Court
found that statements against penal interest are offered into evidence
in "three principal situations": (1) when the prosecutor offers the
statements into evidence against the declarant himself; (2) when a
defendant (not the declarant) offers the statements into evidence
because they tend to exculpate the defendant by indicating that the
declarant, not the defendant, committed the crime charged; and (3)
when the prosecutor offers the statements into evidence to establish
the guilt of the defendant as an accomplice of the declarant.4 1 The
first two situations did not raise any constitutional concerns,'" but the
third, which was the situation confronting the Court in Lilly, was,
according to the plurality, exactly what the Confrontation Clause was
intended to forbid. 43 Notwithstanding that the brother's statement
was against his penal interest (and was thus "inherently reliable"
according to the majority of the circuit courts of appeals), the Court
found that the statements did not satisfy the demands of the
Confrontation Clause because it, and all statements in the third
category, were "inherently unreliable."'" Further, the plurality stated
that confessions made by accomplices that inculpate a criminal
defendant do not fall into "a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay
rule" as defined in the Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.'"
The plurality opinion allowed for the possibility that even
though an accomplice's confession could not satisfy Confrontation
Clause scrutiny by virtue of being a "firmly rooted hearsay exception,"
such a confession might do so if it satisfies the second prong of the
Roberts test - that is, if it contains "'particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.""6 Still, the plurality was skeptical and expressed its
concern in two ways. First, the plurality indicated that an appellate
court should apply a particularly harsh, de novo standard of review to
a lower court's determination of trustworthiness. 7 Second, the
140 See id. at 1901. Justice Stevens authored the plurality opinion,
in which Justices
Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyerjoined. See id.at 1892.
1

See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1895.

See id. at 1895-96.
143 See id.at 1899.
14 See id. at 1897.
1
Id. at 1899. The Court cited Bruton and Cray, among other cases, noting that
they were "premised, explicitly or implicitly, on the principle that accomplice
confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not per se admissible (and thus
necessarily fall outside a firmly rooted hearsay exception)." Id. at n.5.
1
Id. at 1899 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
17 See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1900. The Court explained
that
[niothing in our prior opinions, however, suggests that appellate
42
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plurality strongly doubted that statements against penal interest
could satisfy the particularized guarantees of the trustworthiness
standard, at least when the government is involved in eliciting the
statements, as in guilty pleas or confessions to identified state
officials.'"
Justice Breyer, who joined in the plurality opinion, also wrote a
separate concurring opinion. 49 The Justice noted that the reliability
theory of the Confrontation Clause, which was accepted by the
plurality opinion, had recently come under fierce attack from Justice
Thomas in his concurring opinion in White v. Illinois,ss and from
numerous scholars.'" Although Justice Breyer noted the criticisms
and the evidentiary weaknesses of the reliability theory, he declined
to reexamine the connection between the hearsay rule and the
Confrontation Clause in the Lilly decision because the statements at
issue contravened the Confrontation Clause in any event.'" Instead,
Justice
Breyer left the possibility of reevaluation open for another
53
day.

courts should defer to lower courts' determinations regarding whether
a hearsay statement has particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
To the contrary, those opinions indicate that we have assumed, as with
other fact-intensive, mixed questions of constitutional law, that
"independent review is... necessary... to maintain control of, and to
clarify, the legal principles" governing the factual circumstances
necessary to satisfy the protections of the Bill of Rights.
Id. (partial alteration in original) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
697 (1996)).
14
See id. The Court asserted that
[i]t is highly unlikely that the presumptive unreliability that attaches to
accomplices' confessions that shift or spread blame can be effectively
rebutted when the statements are given under conditions that
implicate the core concerns of the old exparte affidavit practice - that
is, when the government is involved in the statements' production, and
when the statements describe past events and have not been subjected
to adversarial testing.
Id. The Court also held that appellate courts should "independently review whether
the government's proffered guarantees of trustworthiness satisfy the demands of the
[Confrontation] Clause." Id.
1
See id. at 1902 (Breyer,J., concurring).
150 502 U.S. 346, 358 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in
the judgment).
See Lilly, 119 S.Ct. at 1902 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer cited the
following works: Friedman, supra note 125; AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION
AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1997); Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalizationof the
Confrontation Clause: A Proposalfor a ProsecutorialRestraintModel, 76 MINN. L. REv. 557
(1992).
.
See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1903 (Breyer, J., concurring).
53 See id.

20001

CODEFENDANT CONFESSIONS

Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, stated simply that the admission into evidence of the
brother's
tape-recorded
confession
was
a
"paradigmatic
Confrontation Clause violation."'" Justice Scalia cited with approval a
passage from Justice Thomas's concurrence in White, which Justice
Breyer also had cited. 55 In that passage, Justice Thomas stated that
"'[t]he federal constitutional right of confrontation extends to any
witness who actually testifies at trial"' and to "'extrajudicial statements
only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial material,
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.""56
Justice Thomas, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, also cited to his concurrence in White.' 7 Justice Thomas
added a qualification, however, noting that the Confrontation Clause
did not impose a moratorium on the prosecution's use of
accomplices' statements that incriminate defendants.'
Justice
Thomas did not expand on this observation, however, so it is unclear
how to identify exceptions to the ban. Also, Justice Thomas objected
to the plurality's assertion that the taped confession did not have
adequate indicia of reliability to satisfy Confrontation Clause
scrutiny5 9 The Justice suggested that the plurality inappropriately
addressed this issue - an issue upon which the lower courts did not
,60
pass.
The final concurring opinion was authored by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy.6 Chief
Justice Rehnquist took the position that the plurality's entire opinion
was misguided because the tape-recorded confession was, in large
part, "simply not [a] 'declaration[] against penal interest."" 62 The
Chief Justice pointed out that the portions of the confession that
inculpated Lilly were certainly not at all against the declarant's penal
interest. 1 Accordingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not state clearly
154

155
1

Id. at 1903 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See id.
Id. (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring

in part and concurring in the judgment)).

See id.at 1903 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1903 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
thejudgment).

I

See id.

160 See

id.

161 See id.
at 1903 (Rehnquist,CJ., concurring inthejudgment).
6e Id. at 1904 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
16s See

id.
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whether he believed that statements against penal interest fell within
the firmly rooted hearsay exception set forth in Roberts. The Chief
Justice stated, however, that he had no reason to rule out the
possibility that statements against penal interest, including those
statements that inculpate a codefendant, could fall under a firmly
rooted hearsay exception.'
Like Justice Thomas, the Chief Justice also objected to the
plurality's consideration of whether the declarant's confession bore
sufficient indicia of reliability because that issue had not been
considered by the lower courts.'"
Further, the Chief Justice
suggested that, rather than applying the de novo standard that the
plurality had applied to the "indicia of reliability" inquiry, a reviewing
court should "defer[] to trial judges who undertake the second prong
of the Roberts inquiry" because trial judges "are better able to evaluate
whether a particular statement given in a particular setting is
sufficiently reliable that cross-examination would add little to its
trustworthiness."'6
IV. CODEFENDANT CONFESSIONS AFTER LILLY V. VIRGINIA
Because Lilly was a plurality opinion, its consequences are
difficult to assess. There are reasons to believe, however, that Lilly
will inspire state courts and lower federal courts to be especially
protective of defendants' rights in Bruton situations.
A.

The Reassertion of the Confrontation Clause

As discussed, the Bruton-Gray line of cases proceeds on the
premise that the nondeclarant defendant has a right, established by
the Confrontation Clause, that the declarant's statement not be used
against him. This line of cases is concerned with the protection of
that right. The right, however, as defined and limited by the
reliability theory of the Confrontation Clause, has grown weaker and
weaker, riddled with exceptions. As a result, the need for protection
of the nondeclarant had become less urgent than it might otherwise
have been.
The Lilly plurality opinion indicates that several members of the
Court may be prepared to read the Confrontation Clause more
strongly. The plurality's express skepticism about the admissibility
into evidence of statements that were produced with governmental
6
65
1

See LiUy, 119 S. Ct. at 1905 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in thejudgment).

See id.

Id. at 1906 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
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involvement - e.g., confessions and pleas - undermines the Second
Circuit's holding about the use of guilty pleas 6' and those cases that
permitted confessions to be admitted because they fell within the
firmly rooted hearsay exception of Rule 804(b) (3). 6' Furthermore,
the plurality's indication that it would apply a de novo standard of
review to analysis of the "sufficient indicia of reliability" prong of the
Roberts analysis is further evidence of the plurality's determination to
protect the robust nature of the Confrontation Clause. A stronger
reading of the Confrontation Clause would imply (naturally, though
not logically) a clear acknowledgment of the importance of Bruton.
B. New Theory of the Confrontation Clause
Lilly may also indicate that the Court is not simply reading the
Confrontation Clause with a new and welcome vigor, but may in fact
be prepared to abandon the long-discredited reliability theory.
Justice Breyer, in his concurrence in Lilly, expressly suggested a new
theory along the lines of that suggested in Justice Thomas's
concurrence in White, and also by, among others, Professor Akil
Amar' 6 and Professor Robert Friedman. 7 ' Although there are some
differences among their versions of the theory, their basics are the
same. For ease of presentation, this Article summarizes Professor
Friedman's version of the theory.
The starting point of the theory is with the term "witness," as it
appears in the Confrontation Clause. As set forth above, according to
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, the
term "witness" means any person who makes a statement out of court.
The Confrontation Clause thus has tremendous breadth; it applies to
all declarants, but is riddled with exceptions. 7 ' According to
Professor Friedman, however, the term "witness" means only those
people who make statements to governmental authorities with the
expectation that those statements will be used in the investigation or
Thus, according to Friedman, the
prosecution of a crime.72
167

See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text (explaining that coconspirator

statements are admissible in trial).
168 See supra note 130 (providing varying circuit-court holdings concerning the
admissibility of statements against penal interest).
16
See Akhil Reed Amar, Twenty-Fifth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure Forward: Sixth Amendment First Principles,84 GEO. L.J. 641, 688-97 (1996).
:7 See generally Friedman, supra note 125.
See supraIIIA.
See Friedman, supra note 125, at 1040 & n.125. Justice Thomas offers a similar
definition. In his White concurrence, Justice Thomas argues that the Confrontation
Clause applies to "formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions,
1
7
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Confrontation Clause regulates the use of confessions and pleas both of which are made to governmental authorities with the
expectation that they will be used in a criminal proceeding - but
does not apply to, for example, coconspirator statements or excited
utterances.'" For those pieces of evidence, that do fall within the
ambit of the Confrontation Clause, such as confessions and pleas,
Professor Friedman proposes an almost ironclad rule of exclusion:
Admission of such pieces of evidence violates the defendant's right to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, and the confessor or
pleader must be brought into court to give his testimony while
confronting the witness, or else the confession or plea is
inadmissible. 74
The adoption by the Supreme Court of Professor Friedman's
theory (or some variant of it) might have a significant impact on the
development of the Bruton-Gray line of cases. Most declarations that
the government seeks to introduce are confessions taken by police or
other law enforcement officers. If the Court adopted a theory akin to
Professor Friedman's, then there would be a blanket prohibition
against the use of such declarations against anyone but the declarant.
A court faced with the responsibility of redacting or modifying the
declaration to protect the rights of the nondeclaring defendants
would have no doubt that the use of the declaration against the
nondeclarants would violate the nondeclarants' constitutional right.
The fair inference is that the court would thus be extremely careful
to safeguard the right by paraphrasing or thorough redaction.
C. The Definition of Statements Against PenalInterest
In his concurring opinion in Lilly, Chief Justice Rehnquist
suggested an alternative method of handling confessions. The Chief
Justice observed that the declaration at issue in Lilly was not a
declaration against penal interest at all, but rather an attempt to shift
blame from the declarant to the defendant.' For example, the Chief

prior testimony or confessions." White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Professor Amar also applies
the Confrontation Clause to "videotapes, transcripts, depositions, and affidavits when
pregared for court use and introduced as testimony." Amar, supranote 169, at 693.
That does not mean that coconspirator statements or excited utterances are
automatically admitted into evidence. It only means that their admission vel non does
present an issue under the Confrontation Clause. There may be evidentiary reasons,
such as hearsay, authentication, and relevance that would require such statements to
be excluded in any particular case.
14 See Friedman, supra note 125,
at 1013, 1043.
175 See Lilly, 119 S. CL at 1904 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
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Justice noted, Mark's confession put him at the scene of the crime,
but shifted the blame for the murder to Lilly.'76 The Chief Justice
contended that if Mark's confession had in fact implicated Mark as
well as Lilly, then it might have been admissible against Lilly.1"
The ChiefJustice's opinion is in tension with a case that it cited
with approval, Williamson v. United States.'78 In Williamson, Reginald
Harris was arrested with nineteen kilograms of cocaine in his car and
made a confession (actually, a series of sometimes contradictory
confessions) to the police.'g The confessions indicated that both
Harris and another person, Fredel Williamson, were members of a
conspiracy to distribute cocaine. '8 Based on the confession and
other evidence, Williamson was indicted for, among other things,
conspiracy to distribute narcotics. 8' Harris refused to testify at
Williamson's trial, and the government therefore called a Federal
Bureau of Investigation agent to testify about Harris's confession. 2
Williamson was convicted, and the issue before the Supreme Court
was (a) whether all of Harris's confession was admissible pursuant to
Rule 804(b) (3) because it was all part of Harris's statement against
his own penal interest, or (b) whether only those parts of Harris's
confession that directly implicated him were admissible because only
those parts were against his penal interest, with the remainder of the
statement -

the "collateral portions" -

excluded."

The Court held that Rule 804(b) (3) applied narrowly to only
18 4
those portions of a statement that directly implicate the declarant.
The Court then explained, however, that its definition of a "selfinculpatory statement" was broad.a' For example, noted the Court,
"a declarant's squarely self-inculpatory confession - 'yes, I killed X
would likely be admissible under Rule 804(b) (3) against
accomplices of his who are being tried under a coconspirator liability
theory."' The Court continued, "by showing that the declarant knew
176

17

See id.
See id.
U.S. 594 (1994).
See id. at 596-97.

178 512
1

IS0See id.
181 See id. at 597.
182

See id. at 597-98.

l9 See id. at 599-601.
184 See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599.
The Court stated that "the most faithful
reading of Rule 804(b) (3) is that it does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory
statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is generally selfinculpatory." Id. at 600-01.
18

See id. at 603.

186

-.
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something, a self-inculpatory statement can in some situations help
the jury infer that his confederates knew it as well."187 The Court also
noted that even information that "give [s] the police significant details
about the crime may also, depending on the situation, be against the
declarant's interest."'1
Therefore, although the precise definition of "against selfinterest" is not fixed and depends on the circumstances, following
Williamson, there will usually be a good argument that the large part
of most confessions will fall within the "against self-interest"
exception to the rule against hearsay. Such confessions or pleas can
therefore be used against not only the declarant, but also against
anyone else, unless barred by the Sixth Amendment. Lower courts
since Williamson have shown a willingness to review the circumstances
in which a statement is made in order to determine whether it might
conceivably be against the declarant's penal interest.'"
The broad definition of "against self-interest" endorsed by
Williamson and by the lower courts following it casts significant doubt
on the Chief Justice's premise in Lilly that Mark's confession was not
against his penal interest. Although the confession shifted blame to
Lilly for the murderous act itself, it also inculpated Mark in at least
the following ways: (a) The confession showed that he was present at
the scene of the crime (thus eliminating any realistic possibility of an
alibi defense); (b) The confession showed that he had agreed to go
on the crime spree with the defendant (thus laying the groundwork
for a felony-murder or Pinkerton'" theory of liability); (c) The
confession showed that Mark was aware of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the murder, thus indicating that he was
Id.
Id.
189 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 160 F.3d 732, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
120 S. Ct. 81 (1999) (admitting statement pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3) and stating
187
188

that the declarant's "statements that he had informed [the defendants] that [the
victim] was in the area are, set alone, hardly incriminating. But their timing is key.");
United States v. Moses, 148 F.3d 277, 280, 280-81 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 1047 (1999) (admitting statement pursuant to Rule 804(b) (3) in a case involving
tax fraud, when declarant stated that he was "'tak[ing] care' [of the defendant]
'moneywise'" and identified where he was meeting the defendant to make payments;

the court observed that "by naming [the defendant] as well as the place where he was
meeting [the defendant] to make payments, [declarant] provided self-inculpatory

information that might have enabled the authorities to better investigate his
wrongdoing").
In Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), the Court held that a
defendant may be held liable for crimes committed by his coconspirators if the
crimes were in furtherance of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable to the
defendant.
190
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not mentally incapacitated and making it less likely that he could
claim insanity. Proof that the confession inculpated Mark is provided
by the following hypothetical: If Mark were on trial, would his lawyer
attempt to have the statement suppressed if there was a good-faith
basis to do so? The answer is surely "yes," and the reason is selfevident: The confession is harmful to Mark's interests because it
incriminates him.
One defending the Chief Justice's approach in Lilly and the
approach set forth in Williamson might note that people frequently
confess to all or part of a crime, but still attempt to shift the blame to
others. (Indeed, this is exactly what Mark did in Lilly.) In such
circumstances, one might argue that the confessor is not really saying
things "against his penal interest" because he thinks that he is shifting
blame, i.e., inculpating another person and thereby exculpating
himself. Such an analysis depends on certain assumptions about the
declarant's thoughts when he made his statement: Did he realize
that he was incriminating himself, or did he think (incorrectly,
because of his lack of legal sophistication) that he was exculpating
himself and blaming another person? The question is inherently
difficult, if not impossible, to answer: How could a court determine,
in most instances, what the declarant thought when he made his
statement; with what mixture of calculation, aspiration, or
desperation was the statement made?
CONCLUSION

All cases leave some questions unanswered, but Gray and Lilly are
unusually open-ended. Gray's observation that it is not the fact of,
but the kind of, inferences that is important is opaque. Absent
clarification, it will be impossible to say with confidence how to redact
or revise a nontestifying defendant's confession so that it can be
introduced at a joint trial without unfairly prejudicing the
nonconfessing codefendants. Lilly was unable to muster a majority
on the critical questions of whether statements against penal interest
are "firmly rooted hearsay exceptions," and whether, even if they are
not, they may have "sufficient indicia of reliability" to satisfy the
Confrontation Clause. Depending upon how these questions are
answered, Bruton and Gray may simply be moot. The concurring
opinions of Justices Breyer, Scalia, and Thomas in Lilly indicate that
several members of the Court may be ready to adopt a wholly new
theory of the Confrontation Clause, but whether this will happen is
also uncertain.
Notwithstanding their lack of clarity, Gray and Lilly are consistent
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in that they appear to point in the same general direction: Both cases
overruled state-court decisions that had been insufficiently protective
of criminal defendants' rights under the Confrontation Clause.
Because both state courts had followed Supreme Court authority in
reaching their decisions, Gray and Lilly indicate that the Court may
be ready to breathe new life into criminal defendants' Confrontation
Clause rights.

